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ABSTRACT 
The object of this paper is to relate the formulation of labour standards by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) through the creation of Conventions 
and Recommendations as well as its representation as an external check on 
labour standards adopted by world States. New Zealand being the founder 
member of the ILO, the paper focuses on how ILO standards are being 
influenced upon New Zealand, particularly the core Conventions relative to 
Employment Law with an emphasis on those not being ratified, by establishing: 
• The conceptual difficulty presented by legislations of New Zealand as 
against the Conventions and other International Covenants. 
• The rationality/justification for not having ratified Conventions but the 
same remaining a strong moral influence over member States like New 
Zealand as a global common law standard. 
• The ILO complaints mechanisms available and the effectiveness of their 
intervention upon member States, in this instance New Zealand for the 
sanction of non-compliance of ILO standards through bad publicity of its 
failure in the broader context of the overall human rights record. 
Consistent with this approach, the paper also makes an effort towards comparing 
and contrasting concisely the different national approach undertaken by 
Singapore (with whom New Zealand has entered into a Free Trade Agreement) 
and their success of achieving global competitiveness by adopting the ILO 
tripartism concept in its decision making mechanisms of its national socio-
economic policies; thus justifying the need for changes in the approach within 
the ILO for flexibility of application by ensuring the practicality of standards. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents, page, and footnotes) comprises 
approximately 15,000 words. 
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Introduction 
New Zealand and is a founder member of the ILO in 1919 (created by the Treaty 
of Versailles) and it was after the 2nd World War, ILO met in Philadelphia (the 
26th International Labour Conference - presided infect by the former Prime 
Minister of New Zealand Sir Walter Nash); at which conference the aims & 
objectives were broadened and refined with such foresight and vision that the 
unanimous "Declaration of Philadelphia" appended to the International Law 
Organization Constitution remains even today as one of the most powerful 
statement of objectives for the international community on Labour & 
employment matters written. New Zealand has therefore been intimately 
associated with the ILO since its inception. 
1 This paper therefore delves into the 
principles governing the ILO declarations and its influences in New Zealand 
labour/employment policies as well as its difficulties towards not being able to 
adopt all the ILO declarations inspite of being also the founder member of this 
international body and how they get roped in towards "compliance" despite 
having not ratified the respective conventions. 
The ILO 
Before pursumg into the adoption / influences of the ILO Conventions & 
Recommendations, it would perhaps be of essence to look into briefly the 
background of the ILO, its international standards on labour issues and the role 
played by the ILO relative to its Conventions & Recommendations. It is 
worthwhile noting the uniqueness of ILO as a specialised agency amongst UN 
League of Nations, being older than even the UN. The uniqueness being: 
(i) Its tripartite structure having Employer, Worker members as well as 
Government representatives in its governing body and its annual 
conference being the only international forum allowing both 
employers and workers the full voting rights with Governments. 
(ii) Its supervisory power to require member countries to report regularly 
and publicly on the way in which they implement the ratified 
conventions . . 
1 ILO Conventions Ratified (Dept. of Labour) 1993 - Foreword of former Prime Minister ofNZ, 
Mr. Jim Bolger 
1 
The role or the prime function of the ILO, as laid down in its constitution, was to 
establish international standards across wide range of issues related to labour. 
The standards that it has set over the years are collectively called the 
International Labour code & consist mainly of Conventions & Recommendations 
adopted by its annual general conference. From a legal perspective, the 
:fundamental differences between these 2 kinds of instruments are:2 
(i) Conventions. An international labour convention is a treaty, which is 
designed to be ratified by members. In ratifying, the member state 
undertakes to comply with all its provisions and to report regularly 
to the ILO on how it does so. These reports are examined by an 
independent committee of eminent jurists; the Committee of Experts 
on the application of conventions & recommendations. The 
Committee publishes its main :findings m a report as a basis for 
discussions at the annual conference between Governments concerned 
and a tripartite committee of representatives. Individual issues are 
also discussed with members by the Expert committee to enable ILO 
resources to be used for practical assistance if necessary. 
(ii) Recommendations. International labour recommendation sets a 
number of standards as guidelines for Governments to follow. These 
are not a treaty and have no legal force in Employment Law. 
Within 12 months after the ILO annual conference, full text of every Convention 
& Recommendation adopted is published along with a statement of action for NZ 
Government proposes to take on it, as an appendix to Parliamentary Paper (the 
Report of the NZ Government delegates to the Conference; which are available 
in appendices to the Journal of the House ofRepresentatives).
3 
It can therefore be summarised that the ILO was established to formulate labour 
standards through the creation of conventions and to supervise their 
implementation. It represents an important external check on the labour standards 
2 ILO Conventions Ratified (Dept. of Labour), 1993 
3 Id. , P. 9 
2 
adopted by world States. Although the conventions of the ILO are binding only if 
ratified by a member State's Government, as a global common law standard, the 
conventions remain a strong moral influence over member states regardless of 
ratification. Each Member State is therefore bound to respect a certain number of 
principles, which have become like rules above conventions. 
4 
Influences of /LO on New Zealand (NZ) 
ILO influences upon New Zealand can be reasonably deciphered from its actions 
as a member state by way of its: 
(i) Ratifications of Conventions. 
(ii) Rationale for Non-ratification of selected Conventions but 
endeavouring to exercise its adoption as far as possible from a strong 
self imposed obligation. 
This paper cannot cover the entire ILO Conventions to date but will confine to 
essential aspects of those relative to Employment Law perspective, in particular 
the Fundamental ILO Conventions. 
The ILO Governing Body has identified 8 ILO Conventions as being 
fundamental to the rights of human beings at work, irrespective of levels of 
development of individual member states. These rights are a precondition for all 
the others in that they provide for the necessary implements to strive freely for 
the improvement of individual and collective conditions of work. One major 
achievement of the ILO has been the adoption of the Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work 1998. This declaration is of particular importance 
because it is seen as imposing a constitutional obligation on all members:
5 
"arising from the very fact of membership in the Organisation, to respect, 
to promote and to realise in good faith and in accordance with the 
Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are 
the subject of the Conventions." 
4 Freedom of Association Digest of Decisions & Principles of the Committee of Governing Body, 
4th Edition (1996)- (hereafter referred Digest), Para 10 
5 The Role oflnternational Labour Standards, By Gordon Anderson, Employment Law Bulletin 
(referred hereafter as ELB), March 2002, P 22 
3 
The core conventions are those concerned with: 
• Freedom of association and the effective recognition
 of the right to 
collective bargaining (Convention No. 87 and 98); 
• The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labo
ur; 
• The effective abolition of child labour; 
• The elimination of discrimination m respect of 
employment and 
occupation (Convention No. lOOand 111) 
The ILO's adoption of this declaration, and the concentrate
d campaign to make 
its observance a reality represents an important restatement 
of the core values on 
which the organization was founded and hopefully it m
ay provide the most 
effective medium term means to advance core internatio
nal standards. 
6These 
fundamental ILO conventions and its impact of influence u
pon New Zealand is 
therefore of symbolic significance. 
Conventions ratified through registration with the Dire
ctor-General of the 
International Labour Office shall be binding upon NZ af
ter 12 months for a 
period of 10 years and it becomes incumbent upon them to: 
• Establish or designate appropriate mechanisms t
o monitor the 
implementation of the provisions giving effect to th
e respective 
convention after consultation with employers' an
d workers' 
organizations. 
• It must regularly submit a periodic report on its complian
ce with the 
convention. Unions and employers' associations may make
 submissions 
on the government report. These in tum are dealt with b
y the ILO's 
Committee of Experts, which produces a public report co
ncerning the 
country's compliance with the particular convention in que
stion. Where 
there is a serious problem concerning the country's com
pliance, it is 
referred to the tripartite Conference Committee on the A
pplication of 
6 The Role oflntemational Labour Standards, by Gordon Anderso
n, ELB, March 2002, P 22 
4 
Standards during the annual International Labour Conference (the ILO's 
plenary body).7 
In addition to this periodic reporting process, there are two complaints 
procedures under the ILO Constitution for breach of ratified convention. There is 
the procedure under Article 24 of the Constitution, whereby an organization of 
workers or employers can make a representation to the ILO Governing Body that 
a state party has breached a convention; and there is the procedure under Article 
26, under which one state party can complain to Governing Body of a breach of 
convention by another state party. 8 
In the case of conventions not ratified by NZ, the probing questions that would 
need to be addressed in stages would then be: 
a) What is the justification/ rationale for NZ having not ratified? 
b) Would NZ be able to neglect or disregard these conventions as it deems 
appropriate? 
c) Does NZ get influenced by the ILO in anyway inspite of having not 
ratified? 
First and foremost, it is the policy of NZ to ratify all treaties and international 
instruments only when the law of the land becomes compliant. Accordingly the 
Government has specifically stated that "because of the obligations incumbent 
on ratifying countries, NZ ratifies any ILO convention only when there is strict 
compliance of law and practice with all provisions of the particular 
Convention".9 This has been criticised by some commentators as "unduly 
conservative", 10 as the ILO Constitution does not require conformity prior to 
ratification but only when it comes into force 12 months after ratification. 
Despite arguably giving ample time to bring the law into compliance and the 
very nature of ILO conventions has been suggested to contemplate 
implementation by means other than government action, 
11 
the policy remains still 
7 Ratification of JLO Conventions, By Dr. Paul Roth, ELB-Jan 2002, P 4 
8 Id. P 4/5 
9 International Labour Standards and the Review of Industrial Law (1986) by Gordon Anderson 
(NZ Journal ofIR 27, 28) 
10 Id. 29 
II Id. 
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in force and this paper will also further addresses the rationale of having
 to 
continue with such a policy. 
NZ being one of the founder members of the ILO, the most intriguing 
and 
pertinent focus would be on the original stand taken by the Government on
 the 
ratification of ILO Conventions and relating it to the existing governing pol
icy. 
This could be aptly deciphered from the deliberation of Mr. Thom, the 
NZ 
Government delegate at the fourth sitting of the International Labour Confere
nce 
session, San Francisco on 24 th June 1948; the relevant passage of which is be
ing 
quoted: 
" ... that there was a far better prospect of Governments accepting a Conven
tion 
agreed on by the ILO with its tripartite representation than there would b
e if 
proposals reached them from any other organization whatsoever. And this is 
the 
view of NZ Government. 
But I must add here that the mere adoption of a Convention of the ILO
 is 
inadequate. The Convention must be honestly accepted by Governments
 of 
Member States and be properly administered. This involves the creation o
f an 
active, informed and favourable public opinion, and in this connection ev
ery 
well-disposed citizen of nations represented here must accept so
me 
responsibility. Governments exerc1Se great power, but in the last resort 
the 
people possess the power and it depends on how they think and act as to whe
ther 
or not Conventions become realities in industrial and social life. More than 
the 
Convention, even, is the popular will, and to ensure that the Convention 
will 
yield its best effect that will must be public-spirited and enlightened."
12 
This paper will therefore take cogrusance of this standpoint and apply 
the 
adoption / acceptability of the Conventions below to the Governm
ent, 
Employers, Workers and the public at large. Although international lab
our 
standards and their application probably do not feature largely in the d
aily 
concerns of unions, employees and employers in New Zealand it is, from time
 to 
time, worth recalling that the labour standards taken for granted in New Zeal
and 
12 4th Sitting of International Labour Conference, 31
51 session, San Francisco, 24/06/ 1948, By Mr. 
Thorn - NZ Govt. Delegate 
6 
are not enjoyed by the great majority of the world's workers. Indeed in m
any 
countries workers do not enjoy even the most basic of standards. 
/LO Interferences & Its Implications 
Freedom of Association 
The 2 Conventions of relevance are: 
• Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948 (No.87). 
• Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.98). 
Convention 87 provides that workers have the right to establish and 
join 
organizations of their own choice without government interference; they have
 the 
right to draw up their own rules, choose their own representatives, organise t
heir 
own administration and decide upon their own programmes; and governm
ent 
administrative authorities may not dissolve or suspend these organizations. 
Convention 98 deals with several aspects of freedom of association. It provides
 
that workers must be protected against discrimination on the grounds of t
heir 
union membership or union activities. It also provides that organizations of
 
workers and employers must be protected against acts of interference
, m 
particular the domination of workers' organizations by employers. 
The 
convention seeks to ensure the promotion of collective bargaining through 
''the 
autonomy of the parties and voluntary nature of negotiations"
13 
These two conventions have long ranked among the "core" ILO standa
rds. 
Freedom of Association is fundamental to the structural integrity of the I
LO 
since one third of ILO's constituency is comprised of workers' organisatio
ns. 
Thus, when a country becomes a member of the ILO it implicitly acce
pts 
obligations connected with the right of freedom of association.
14 
The greatest conceptual difficulty presented by Employment Legislations in 
NZ 
relates to defining the concept of "freedom of association". A fundame
ntal 
conflict exists between NZ Bill of Rights based notions of "freedom
 of 
association" on one hand and the meaning accorded to that in an employm
ent 
13 Ratification ofTLO Conventions, By Paul Roth, ELB - Jan 2002, P 4 
14 Id. 
7 
law context on the other. The rights as provided in the Bill of Rights Act 1990 
are public rights conferred by the State to maintain democratic order. None entail 
affirmative action of any description. In this context of employment, freedom of 
association means nothing more than individuals having the right to assemble. 
15 
In the same manner, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 states: 
1. Every one shall have the right to freedom of association of 
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interest. 
2. No restrictions may be placed on this right other than those, 
which are prescribed by law, which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security and 
public safety .. .16 
The principal provisions relevant to trade unions and worker organizations would 
be The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 
which states under Article 8: 
a) The right of every one to form trade unions and join the trade union of his 
choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned for the 
promotion and protection of his economic and social interest. No 
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interest of national security or public order or for the protection 
and freedom of others. 
b) The right of trade unions to establish trade unions. 
c) The right of trade unions to function freely to no limitations other than 
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in the 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public order 
or for the protection and freedoms of others. 
d) The right to strike provided that it is exercised in conformity with the 
laws of the particular country.
17 
15 Westlaw - 28 CA WILJ 65, P 1 
16 Employment Law Guide (hereafter referred as ELG) 2001, 5th Edition, Para ERpt 3.12(1) 
17 ELG 2001, Para ERpt 3.12(2) 
8 
Countries, which have ratified both the Covenants, must report on the meas
ures 
taken, and on the progress made in achieving the rights the Covenant. Rep
orts 
are made to the UN Economic and Social Council. New Zealand has ratified b
oth 
Covenants, but entered reservations in respect of the articles relating to tr
ade 
union rights. These reservations were primarily required because features of N
ew 
Zealand law at the time, such as compulsory unionism, union mono
poly 
bargaining rights, and the power to deregister unions, were not compatible 
with 
the Covenants. 
18 
Most OECD countries have ratified Conventions No. 87 or 98; two except
ions 
however are NZ and the USA.
19 As a matter of fact, New Zealand is one of the 
few prominent members of the ILO that has not ratified these two conventi
ons, 
which are the principle ILO conventions relating to the right to freedom 
and 
having been declared as the factor in the achievement of social justice and on
e of 
the principal elements in the achievement of lasting peace; without which
 the 
concept oftripartism would be meaningless. 
In the light of this, a comparative assessment of the international coven
ants 
mentioned above together with the NZ Government's policy rationale be m
ade 
against the following relevant procedural function of the ILO and man
date 
accorded to its Committee on Freedom of Association:
20 
1. Complaints lodged with the Committee can be submitted whether or no
t 
the country concerned has ratified the freedom of association 
Conventions. 
11. Where national laws, including those interpreted by the High Cour
ts, 
violate the principles of freedom of association, the Committee always 
considered it within its mandate to examine the laws, provide guidelines 
and offer the ILO's technical assistance to bring the laws into compliance 
with the principles of freedom of association, as set out in the constitution 
of the ILO and the applicable Conventions. 
18 ELG, ERpt 3.2 
19 Id., ERpt 3.3 
2° Freedom of Association, Digest of Decisions & Principles of the Committee (hereafter referred 
as Digest), Para 5,8,I0,11,13,21,23,24,25 & 27 
9 
m. When a State decides to become a Member of the ILO, i
t accepts the 
fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution and the Decla
ration, 
including the principles of freedom of association. 
1v. All Governments are obliged to respect fully the 
commitments 
undertaken by ratification of ILO Conventions. 
v. A State cannot use the argument that other commitments or
 agreements 
can justify the non-application of ratified ILO Conventions. 
v1. In all the cases presented to it since it was first set up, the c
ommittee has 
always considered that the replies from governments against 
whom 
complaints are made should not be limited to general observations. 
vu. When the Committee requests a government to furnish reco
rds of judicial 
proceedings, such a request does not reflect in anyway on the integ
rity or 
independence of the judiciary. The essence of judicial procedure is 
that its 
results are known, and confidence in its impartiality rests on thei
r being 
known. 
vm. The development of free and independent organizations a
nd negotiation 
with all those involved in social dialogue is indispensable to en
able a 
government to confront its social and economic problems and r
esolve 
them in the best interests of the workers and the nation. 
ix. Development needs should not justify maintaining the entire
 trade union 
movement of a country in an irregular legal situation, thereby prev
enting 
the workers from exercising their trade union rights, as well as prev
enting 
organizations from carrying out their normal activities. A ba
lanced 
economic and social development requires the existence of a stro
ng and 
independent organization. which can participate in the proce
ss of 
development. 
x. The fundamental objective of trade union movement should 
be to ensure 
the development of the social and economic well being of all worker
s. 
If the 3 probing questions mentioned earlier are now assessed against
 the above 
functions and mandates relative to that of the International Covena
nts stated and 
that of the NZ Government policy, it would be quite obvious that t
he solution to 
the social and economic problems of any country is dependant upon:
 
10 
• The socio-economic policies/direction of the Governm
ent being the 
critical factor for: 
• The potential business investment climate and expans
ion of existing 
business enterprises being the critical factor for: 
• The occupational and economic interests of workers. 
All the 3 parties are therefore inter-related. ILO, whilst e
mphasising on the 
workers interest/safe-guard, it does not seem to have provided
 any ' safety net' to 
employers and the government on any eventual "mala:fide" ac
tions by workers or 
trade union leaders for their own self-interest/power resu
lting in economic 
instability of the Employers, the Nation and/or detriment to 
the public interest; 
which is also contrary to that of the two international cove
nants stated above. 
The essence of the tripartite concept as articulated Mr. Thor
n above is also non 
evident. 
Complaints Mechanism 
In addition there are two ILO procedures for dealing with 
complaints where a 
country (like NZ at present) has not ratified Convention 87 
or 98. In 1950, the 
Governing Body of the ILO established the Fact-Finding
 and Conciliation 
Commission on Freedom of Association (FFCC). It is
 comprised of 9 
independent members appointed by the Governing Body. C
ases may only be 
examined by the FFCC if however; the government concer
ned consents to 
participate in the process. It was not until 1964, however, tha
t a government first 
agreed to be subjected to the process and in its existence the F
FCC has examined 
only 6 cases.
21 Consisting as it does of a procedure, which respects traditio
nal 
procedural guarantees, it is relatively long &costly and has o
nly been used in a 
limited number of cases. 
22 The shortcomings of this consensual jurisdiction were 
remedied with the establishment in 1951 of the Committe
e on Freedom of 
Association. Since this committee is made up of members of
 the governing body 
itself, it does not rely upon a state's consent to deal with co
mplaints. Since its 
establishment, it has investigated about 2000 complaints, 
six of which were 
brought against NZ.
23 
2 1Ratification ofILO Conventions, Dr. Paul Roth , ELB, Jan 200
2, P 5 
22 Digest, P 2 
23Id., ELB, Jan 2002, P 5 
11 
Nevertheless, having established that complaints can 
be still lodged and the 
obligations for New Zealand to have due regard towar
ds implementation of the 
ILO principles & policies laid down in the Convent
ions by virtue of its 
membership, it may now be prudent to see how the
 interference I influence 
process ofILO in relation to NZ employment issues from
 the following cases: 
i) In June 1979, the NZ Public Services Association
 (PSA) lodged a 
complaint to ILO on the introduction of a Bill into
 Parliament that 
threatens to deregister the PSA and confiscate its as
sets following an 
industrial dispute affecting 2000 of its members. It requ
ested early action 
by the ILO to maintain trade union rights. This 
Bill would have 
authorised the Minister of State Services to withdraw r
ecognition of the 
Association, if in respect of any discontinuance of em
ployment he was 
satisfied that this had caused or was likely to cause
 serious loss or 
inconvenience. One of the effects would have been to
 place the assets 
under the temporary management of the Public Trustee. 
However, following the PSA's initiative to refer the 
dispute over the 
electricity workers to industrial mediation, the Gover
nment agreed to 
withdraw the Bill from Parliament. Accordingly, in 
July 1979 PSA 
expressed the desire to withdraw its complaint. The 
ILO Committee 
however being guided by a principle that once a repres
entation has been 
submitted to it, it alone was competent to decide what
 effect should be 
given to it and that "the withdrawal by the organizat
ion must be well 
founded and not by exercise of pressure by the Governm
ent. After having 
established the facts furnished thoroughly, the Committ
ee noted that the 
decision was not one that was coerced and therefore 
does not call for 
further exarnination.
24 
ii) In March 1980, the NZ Federation of Labour allege
d to the ILO the 
Government's contravention of the principles of freedo
m of association 
as follows: 
24 Case No 936 -197
1
h report of the Committee on Freedom of Association (CF
A) 
12 
a) The Fishing Industry (Union Coverage) Act 1979, 
which limits 
the freedom of coverage of union activities. 
b) Discretionary powers vested upon the Registrar 
of Industrial 
Unions & Arbitration Court and the Minister of Labour
 through 
the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
The Govt. clarified to the Committee that it is m
erely protecting 
traditional rights of :fishermen who were not members o
f any union and 
worked without a master-servant relationship. Second
ly, rationalising 
union structure to that of a single industry-based union. 
The Committee recommended to the ILO Governing B
ody to draw the 
attention of the Govt. that: 
• The fundamental principles of freedom of associati
on is that workers' 
organizations should be able to draw up and am
end their own 
constitutions and rules; 
• Governments should promote and encourage collectiv
e bargaining and 
• Establishment of unions for workers should be 
without distinction 
whatsoever so as to establish and join on their own choosi
ng. 
• Minister's discretion appears to go beyond mere fo
rmalities concerning 
requirements for registration of workers' organization.
25 
iii) In May 1985, NZ Employers Federation alleged that th
e government through 
the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1985 had: 
a) Reintroduced compulsory trade unionism by way 
of a 18 month 
statutory compulsion for trade union membership 
upon attaining 
employment and the unions being free to decide o
n the level of 
subscriptions. 
b) The requirement for employer to dismiss any worker 
who fails to join 
a union unless granted exemption. 
All of the above are an infringement of the freedom 
of association as it is 
incompatible with workers right to join of his choosing re
sulting in not providing 
workers the effective choice of unions as well as a bre
ach to the fundamental 
principle governing human rights. 
25 Case No 956 - 204
1
h report of CF A 
13 
The government and the Federation of Labour defend
ed the legislative 
imposition as it: 
a) Also laid down democratic requirement of balloting after t
he eighteen-
month period. 
b) Recognises a collective responsibility to negotiate wit
h exclusive 
bargaining rights. 
The Committee for Freedom of Association recommended to 
its Governing Body 
that: 
a) Union security is similar to those establishing a trade unio
n monopoly 
and such being not compatible with the rights of workers to e
stablish and 
join organization of their choosing. Compulsory union mem
bership for 
eighteen months is therefore not compatible with this principle.
 
b) The balloting procedures are not in conflict with the p
rinciples of 
freedom of association. 
26 
iv) In November 1988, the NZ Employers Federation lodged 
a complaint relative 
to changes in the system of union registration contained in th
e Labour Relations 
Act 1987 as follows: 
};i- The granting of broad exclusive rights to uruons 
by registration 
eliminated workers' freedom to choose resulting in the con
tinuance of 
what amounted to compulsory union membership. 
};i- Excessively high minimum membership requirement of 
1 OOO members 
gave monopoly to existing registered union and hindered 
the further 
creation of trade unions. 
The government defended its position by emphasising that: 
};i- It does not hinder formation of any unregistered union exc
ept that they 
will not have excess to the Labour Court but remedy can 
be enforced 
through contract law in civil courts. 
};i- Minimum membership requirement 1s an essential com
ponent of the 
Government's policy designed to encourage the development 
of effective 
and efficient union. 
26 Case No 1334 -244th report of CF A 
14 
};;>- Formal requests can be made to the government 
for the rmrumum 
membership requirement to be lowered. 
The Committee in its conclusion expressed regret over the
 government's inability 
to supply information/data concerning key issues of the
 real existence of free 
choice unions, the democratic process to change union cov
erage and evidence on 
the existence of any other unregistered organizations. Th
e Committee therefore 
recommended to its governing body that: 
a) The union registration system seriously hindered in s
o far as workers 
would be motivated to only registered organization
s since such 
organizations enjoy broader rights; thus denying wor
kers right to 
establish and join organizations of their own choosing. 
b) Depriving workers in small bargaining units who ar
e dispersed over 
wide geographical areas of the right to form organizatio
ns capable of 
fully exercising trade union activities is contrary to the
 principles of 
freedom of association. 
c) It consequently requested the government to re-exa
mine the system 
established under the 1987 Act in the light of the principl
es of freedom 
of association and asks the government to keep it informe
d of any steps 
taken in this connection. 
27 
v) One of the most lengthy complaints made to the ILO
 with complexity of 
issues covered was by the New Zealand Council of Trad
e Unions (NZCTU) 
who brought a complaint on the grounds that by virtue o
f membership of the 
ILO itself, the NZ Govt. was bound to respect the princ
iples of freedom of 
association. 2
8 The NZCTU had three basic complaints: first, it argue
d the 
Employment Contracts Act does not promote collect
ive bargaining. For 
example, so-called collective agreements were not collect
ive in the true sense 
as envisioned by the ILO, but were simply an aggreg
ation of individual 
agreements. To support its claim, the NZCTU cited 
Adams v. Alliance 
Textiles29 case, where the employer had approache
d union members 
27 Case No 133 -256
1
h report of CF A 
28 Case No 1698, 292"d report of CF A 
29 (1993) 1 ERNZ 360 
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individually and asked them to withdraw the bargai
ning authorities given to 
the union and sign non-union contracts that offered
 bonuses. Secondly, the 
NZCTU argued the Act was contrary to the princip
le that the parties should 
bargain in good faith and make every effort to reac
h an agreement. The Act 
enables employers to dominate the appointment of b
argaining representatives. 
Furthermore, the ratification and authorization proc
edures hinder collective 
bargaining and the right to organize. Thirdly, t
he NZCTU argued the 
Employment Contracts Act restricted the
 right to strike. 
The ILO's Freedom of Association Committee 
made fifteen principal 
recommendations in its interim report. The most not
able are first, negotiation 
between employers and worker organisations sho
uld be encouraged and 
promoted; second, the Act does not promote colle
ctive bargaining and the 
Government should take steps to ensure that the le
gislation encourages and 
promotes collectivity; third, the Committee held the 
Act provided inadequate 
protection for workers against acts of interferenc
e and discrimination by 
employers in the case of authorization of a union.
 Thus, the Government 
requires the legislation to enact explicit remedies and
 penalties against acts of 
interference and discrimination on the basis of autho
rization of a union. The 
Committee also criticized the Act's requirement th
at a union establish its 
authority for all workers it claims to represent in neg
otiations for a collective 
employment contract. This requirement is excess
ive and contradicts the 
freedom of association principles, because it may be 
used to impede the right 
of a workers' organization to represent its members. 
The Committee therefore 
requested that the Government remove the offending
 provisions from the Act. 
The recommendations of the Freedom of Association
 Committee constituted a 
scathing attack on the credibility of the Employmen
t Contracts Act. 
30 In the 
final report, the Committee had concluded that ''taken
 as a whole, the Act does 
not encourage and promote collective bargaining", an
d recommended that the 
Government take appropriate steps to ensure that l
egislation encourage and 
promote voluntary collective bargaining. The Comm
ittee also concluded that 
"protection against interference and discrimination on
 the basis of membership 
of a union is insufficient in the New Zealand c
ontext", and asked the 
30 Westlaw- 28 CA WILJ 65 
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Government to take the necessary measures to ex
plicitly prevent acts of 
interference and discrimination in the basis of the a
uthorisation on a union. 
Concern was also expressed on the independence of
 the parties to collective 
bargaining and the Committee asked the Government
 to amend the legislation 
to prevent negotiations being undertaken by organ
ization appointed by or 
under the domination of employers. The Committee als
o found that: 
" .. s 63(e) which prohibits strikes if they are concern
ed with the issue of 
whether a collective employment contract will bind m
ore than one employer 
is contrary to the principles of freedom of association
 on the right to strike 
and that workers and their organizations should be ab
le to call for industrial 
action in support of multi-employer contracts." 
The Government responded to the ILO's recommen
dations in an attempt to 
justify the rationale behind the Act. The ILO sent a 
direct contact mission to 
New Zealand to investigate the matter further and prod
uced a final report. 
The Committee's final report being heavily influence
d by subsequent judicial 
developments which signalled a marked reversal of 
its approach in Eketone 
stated, ''the Committee noted that developments have 
taken place which have a 
bearing on the issues discussed in the interim report, 
and in particular various 
Court decisions which have to a certain extent clarifie
d the meaning of several 
provisions of the Act". It goes on to examine the var
ious cases in some detail 
and concludes: 
" ... it is perhaps unfortunate but not unusual for new
 labour legislation to 
require a period of testing and judicial interpretation b
efore it can be applied 
with certainty and this consideration applies with sp
ecial force when the 
changes introduced by the legislation are radical an
d result in a system 
which is unique in nature .. .It is to be hoped that the d
ecision of the Court of 
Appeal in Capital Coast will clarify the meaning an
d interrelation of the 
relevant provisions in the Act". 
31 
31 ELG, 2001, Para ERpt 3.6 
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The report goes on to discuss problems with collective bargaining. 
It accepted 
"on a prima facie basis that a significant number of collective 
bargaining 
problems have arisen and continue to arise". The Committee con
cluded that 
"in effect, it seems that the Act allows collective bargaining by
 means of 
collective agreements, along with other alternatives, rather than pro
moting and 
encouraging it". Of course, the Conventions require the latter o
ption. The 
Committee expressed the view that most of the problems stemme
d from the 
EC Act's philosophy, which placed individual and collective con
tracts and 
individual representation on the same footing. The Committee
 found "it 
difficult to reconcile" this as being in accord with the ILO principl
e faith, and 
suggested that bypassing representative organizations, where they e
xist, might 
be "detrimental to the principle that negotiation between emp
loyers and 
organizations of workers should be encouraged and promoted". 
Finally, the Committee repeated its criticism of the prohibition 
on strikes 
relating to multi-employer contracts. 
The only other recommendation made by the Committee was the ex
pression of 
"the hope that the Government will initiate and pursue tripartite dis
cussions as 
part of a process of ensuring that the provisions of the Employmen
t Contracts 
Act are fully consistent with [the established principles on
 collective 
bargaining]". 
A realistic assessment of the report is that the Committee saw 
significant 
divergence between the EC Act and the ILO standards on
 collective 
bargaining and promoting and encouraging it, the difference in philo
sophy was 
seen as being at the heart of the problems with the EC Act. The
 comment 
might also be made that the more restrained stance taken by the Co
mmittee in 
its final report owed little to the Government itself, rather the way in which 
the 
Court's have interpreted the Act.
32 
One issue that seemed to escape the Committee's attention was the 
prohibition 
on secondary and sympathy strikes, even by workers in the same
 economic 
32 ELG, 2001, Para ERpt 3.6 
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unit. Similar restrictions have been the subject of adverse comment i
n reports 
in the UK.33 
The two principal recommendations stressed upon are: first, it reasse
rted that 
the Government should have regard for the principles of collective b
argaining 
and recommended that the Government initiate and pursue 
tripartite 
discussions to ensure the Act was consistent with the principles of fre
edom of 
association. Second, workers and their organizations should be able to
 call for 
industrial action in support of multi-employer collective contracts, 
which is 
illegal under section 63(e) of the Act.
34 
The fifteen recommendations of the original report were reduced to fo
ur in the 
final report. The Government and the Employers Federation consequ
ently felt 
justified in arguing that the Employment Contracts Act had been vind
icated. In 
a public statement, the Federation President went so far as to say: "
The new 
findings of the ILO are a substantial endorsement of the fairness and
 value of 
the Act." He also said: "It is pleasing that the ILO came to recognise
 that the 
underlying philosophy of the Employment Contracts Act gives equal 
rights to 
employees and employers .... " On the other hand, the NZCTU argued
 that the 
bulk of the final report substantially confirmed the ILO's earlier findi
ngs. The 
final report in no way endorsed the freedom of association provisio
ns in the 
Act. The ILO has consistently maintained that the philosophical found
ations of 
the Act are incompatible with the right to freedom of association b
ecause it 
does not positively promote the right to bargain col
lectively. 
The Committee requested to "be kept informed of developments," a
nd New 
Zealand's case before the ILO remained alive. The Court of Appeal de
cision in 
Fire Service Commission v. Ivamy (1996) 1 E.R.N.Z.85 re-opened the
 issue of 
whether the Employment Contracts Act offends Conventions 87 
and 98. 
Subsequently, in 1996, the NZCTU reiterated the Government's co
ntinuing 
breach of the Conventions to the ILO. At its half yearly session in N
ovember 
1996, the ILO Governing Body adopted a report reminding the Govern
ment to 
33 ELG, 2001, P.122 
34 28 CA WlLJ 65, P 4 
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act on its 1994 recommendations. 
35 
Regardless of the outcome, the principal difficulty with the ILO's complaint 
mechanism is that the decisions of the Freedom of Association Committee are 
advisory only. It does not require the Government to ensure that the provisions 
of the Act are in accord with the Committee's recommendations. The 
Government's inaction demonstrates it probably has no intention of doing so. 
However, the ILO is a high profile international organization of which a large 
proportion of the world's states are members. The NZCTU's complaint 
generated publicity both in New Zealand and abroad and was a considerable 
source of embarrassment to the Government, as it was forced to defend its 
position and justify the content of the Act. 
36 
The failure in ratification resulted primarily from the fact that the legislatively 
protected position of trade unions, until 1991 , was contrary to the terms of those 
instruments. Compulsory union membership and monopoly rights to bargain 
within an industry were both regarded as contravening the conventions. The EC 
Act removed most of the barriers to ratification identified at that time, but it 
also moved the law too far in the opposite direction to allow ratification. 
37 
Regardless of ratification, however, the adoption of international instruments 
may still be influential in the interpretation of domestic law. In Eketone V 
Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd. (1993), it was stated: 
"It is appropriate to have regard to such international instruments when 
interpreting the scope of those rights under other legislation. Nothing in those 
instruments requires a broader prohibition than that found in s 8 EC Act, that 
there must be no direct or indirect exertion of undue influence with intent to 
interfere with the freedom of choice as to membership of an employees 
association. Freedom of Association is much broader than the rights to join or 
notjoin."38 
35 28 CA WILJ 65, P 4/5 
36 Id. , P 5 
37 ELG, 2001, Para ERpt 3.4 
38 (1993) 2 ERNZ 784,795 (CA), Gault J 
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The decision in NZ Fire Service Commission v Ivamy [1996] 1 ERNZ 85, 
represents a further development toward extinguishing entirely the promotion of 
collective bargaining. This case law has moved to a position where freedom of 
association means nothing more than freedom of assembly. The Court of 
Appeal followed this line of reasoning in taking a restrictive view of freedom of 
association in New Zealand. In that case the right to bargain collectively was 
held not to form part of the freedom to associate protected by the NZ Bill of 
rights but to be a statutory right deriving from the EC Act. It was thus seen as 
subordinate to an employer's freedom of expression. In the process, the Court 
of Appeal through majority decision appeared to overlook ( or ignore) the 
position it had taken in Eketone. 
While international standards are clearly influential in domestic law, it is also 
clear that this influence is only one of several factors that operated to guide 
legal interpretation. If the standards are to be fully part of the domestic legal 
system the relevant conventions need to be ratified and given full effect in New 
Zealand law. 3
9 
This is totally at variance with Conventions 87 and 98 and international law 
contained in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Justice Thomas in his dissenting decision on the Ivamy' s case summed up the 
effect of the majority decision when he said, "Such a decision will effectively 
bring to an end the practice of collective bargaining for a collective employment 
contract as recognised and defined by the EC Act',4o 
Rejected Philosophy of the EC Act 
The free market "new right" philosophy that underpinned the Employment 
Contracts Act broadly viewed the labour market like any other market. The 
wage-work bargain was essentially a commercial exchange, with the 
39 ELG, 2001, Para ERpt 3.4 
40 NZ Fire Service Commission v lvamy (1996) I ERNZ 89 (CA) 
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employment contract, as entered into between the parties, b
eing the primary 
means of determining the rights and obligations in the employm
ent relationship. 
This relationship was viewed as essentially one betwee
n the individual 
employee and employer only, with no particularly necessar
y role for trade 
unions to play. 
In the spirit of deregulation, unions were not treated any dif
ferently from any 
other type of "employees organization," "bargaining agent
," or "employee 
representative". Whereas prior labour law promoted pluralism
, whereby unions 
were granted special rights in relation to organising and repres
enting workers in 
order to redress an accepted inherent imbalance of power betw
een workers and 
employers, the Employment Contracts Act proceeded from a u
nitarian frame of 
reference, which viewed workers and their employers as sha
ring an essential 
commonality of interest. Labour and capital were not in comp
etition with each 
other. Rather, the true competition was taking place in the c
ommercial arena, 
with one enterprise competing against another. Where an emp
loyer prospered, 
therefore, so too did the employer's workers.
41 
This did not mean that equity was no longer an important val
ue. Equity in the 
labour market, however, was not to be achieved through gover
nment regulation 
and the promotion of unionism, but through the market place
 itself Unionism 
was viewed as discriminating against the unemployed, as it k
ept the price of 
labour artificially high, keeping the unemployed out of the lab
our market. The 
market place, on the other hand, did not discriminate against 
the unemployed. 
The most effective protection for workers as a whole, theref
ore, was a truly 
competitive labour market. 
The chief innovations introduced by the Employment Contracts 
Act were: 
• The dismantling of the award system; 
• The removal of the special legal status and privileges a
ccorded to 
unions; and 
41 NZ Law Seminar, October 2000, The Philosophy Behind The
 ERA (hereafter referred as 
NZLS), P 1/2 
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• The establishment of a single statutory regune covenng all 
employment relationships. 
In removing the "blanket coverage" of awards, the legislation changed t
he 
fundamental basis on which many employees' terms and conditions 
of 
employment were based. No longer were fundamental terms and conditions 
to 
be determined on the basis of occupational class, but through direct negotiati
on 
by the parties themselves, or their representatives, on the enterprise lev
el. 
Moreover, the ability of employees to negotiate multi-employer collecti
ve 
employment contracts, that is, contracts in the nature of an award, was restrict
ed 
in that employers were not required to participate in negotiations for su
ch 
contracts if they did not wish to, and no industrial action was lawful in respe
ct 
to such negotiations. 
The Employment Contracts Act also made union membership voluntary, a
nd 
viewed freedom of association as not only the freedom to join a union, but 
as 
the freedom not to join a union - in other words, as a freedom to dis-associa
te. 
Moreover, the legislation generally did not promote unionism, as New Zeala
nd 
was bound to do by virtue of its membership in the International Labo
ur 
Organisation. The Employment Contracts Act took a neutral stance insofar 
as 
unions were concerned, so that unions became merely one type of possib
le 
agent in relation to the representation of employees' interests.
42 
The Employment Contracts Act also established a single statutory regime 
to 
regulate employment relationships. This regime applied to all employees, n
ot 
just those who were unionised or covered by awards. With this move, unio
ns 
lost their unique rights of access to statutory personal grievance procedures an
d 
other rights available only to them under labour law legislation. Those righ
ts 
stood in stark contrast to the more limited causes of action under common la
w 
that were available to the non-unionised workforce. The loss of this potenti
al 
enticement also had the effect of contributing to the decline in unio
n 
membership. 43
 
42 NZLS P 2 
43 NZLS, P 3 
' 
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The channelling process of complaints to the ILO therefore brought about their 
intervention. Ultimately, the sanction for non-compliance with the ILO 
standards is bad publicity. If the country concerned has not remedied a 
situation, it will be reminded of its failure in subsequent ILO country reports, 
which will normally be echoed in the broader context of the country's overall 
human rights record when periodic reports are considered under the two major 
United Nations human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights. 44 
Compliance Through The Employment Relations Act (ERA) 
The rejected philosophy of the EC Act thus lead to the passing of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA), the object of which as set out in 
Section 3 is two fold: 
To build productive employment relationships through the promotion of 
mutual trust and confidence in all aspects of the employment environment and 
of the employment relationship 
and 
To promote observance in New Zealand of the principles underlying 
International Labour Organisation Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, 
and Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively.
45 
The legislation treats these two aims as interdependent. The link between 
mutual trust and confidence, and the promotion of unionism and collective 
bargaining; the relationships in which there is a mutual respect, therefore, are 
assumed to depend on there being some degree of relative equality between the 
· 46 parties. 
44 Ratification of lLO Conventions, ELB, Jan 2002, By Dr. Paul Roth. 
45 NZLS P 4 
46 NZLS: P.4 
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The ERA therefore: 
• Represents a half-way house between the Employment Contracts Act 
and a return to the more distant past. In terms of international standards, 
it is very much middle-of-the-road, but still within the relatively light-
handed Anglo-American style of labour market regulation. 
• Has not resurrected the award system. However, the legislation makes 
provision for the negotiation of multi-employer agreements, which have 
the potential to become smaller versions of awards. Given the 
disappearance of an industry approach to employment contract 
negotiations over the past decade, together with the imposition of certain 
procedural requirements for the negotiation of multi-employer 
agreements, such instruments are not likely to be common, and 
enterprise-level bargaining is going to be the norm. 
• Has reversed the previous legislation's approach and now promoted 
unionism instead of adopting a neutral ( or as some perceived it, a hostile 
position. Union membership, however, remains voluntary, but only 
unions are empowered to negotiate collective employment agreements. 
Individuals can be represented in negotiations or legal disputed by 
representatives of their choice, which includes lawyers. 
• Preserves the single statutory regime approach to labour law, and even 
strengthens it by abolishing alternative common law actions that been 
available to employees in connection with dismissals. The Act thus 
retains the extensive provision for individual rights that had been 
introduced by the Employment Contracts Act.
47 
Before the Employment Contracts Act was enacted, industrial legislation 
in 
New Zealand was structured around collective rights and actions. Even perso
nal 
grievances were primarily collective actions. The main recourse for individu
als 
outside this statutory framework was to pursue a common law action in t
he 
courts of general jurisdiction. The opening up of the specialist labour l
aw 
47 NZLS, October 2000, P 3 
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institutions to direct access by individuals is what has led to the phenomenal 
growth of this area of the law in the past decade. Unfortunately, the institutions 
have had difficulty in coping with the great volume of cases in a timely manner, 
which accounts for the reforms made by the Employment Relations Act in 
relation to institutional arrangements.
48 
The building of productive employment relationships is to be promoted by the 
following means (s3(a)): 
• Recognising that employment relationships must be built on good faith 
behaviour; 
• Acknowledging and addressing the inherent inequality of bargaining 
power in employment relationships; 
• Promoting collective bargaining; 
• Protecting the integrity of individual choice; 
• Promoting mediation as the primary problem-solving mechanism; 
• Reducing the need for judicial intervention. 
The first three of these matters represent a sharp break with the Employment 
Contracts Act, while the final three look backwards and build upon it. 
49 
As one of the principle objects of the ERA is ''to promote observance in New 
Zealand of the principles underlying International Labour Organization 
Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, and Convention98 on the Right to 
Organise and Bargain Collectively".
50 A number of aspects of these 
conventions have been incorporated into the ERA, while in relation to other 
aspects the particulars will have to be worked out by the Courts in their 
purposeful interpretation and application of the legislation. It would therefore 
be essential to now look at what ratification of ILO Conventions 87 and 98 
means in terms of New Zealand's compliance with international obligations, 
48 NZLS, P.3 
49 Id., P.4 
50 S.3(b) ERA 
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and to canvass what effect the legislative object of "promoting observance
" of 
the principles underlying the two ILO conventions has had thus far in
 the 
interpretation and application of the ERA.
51 
The government is currently positioning New Zealand to ratify 
ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98, something it has been unable to do in the past, and
 it is 
now engaged in an assessment process towards that end. The Departmen
t of 
Labour is currently preparing a process and timetable for considering
 the 
implications of ratifying Conventions 87 and98. As stated earlier, ratification o
f 
Conventions 87 and 98 will have the practical effect of "locking in" the IL
O's 
freedom of association standards for any subsequent New Zealand legisla
tion. 
This is because firstly, the ILO considers these standards fundamental, 
and 
therefore it would be politically unacceptable to resile from principles that
 are 
regarded as binding on countries, which are members of the ILO. Secon
dly, 
Conventions 87 and 98 require that the relevant right of denunciation can 
only 
be exercised ten years after a country has ratified the treaty, and then it does
 not 
actually take effect until one year after the date on which the denunciation
 has 
been registered with the Director-General of the ILO. Ratification of the 
two 
conventions will therefore mean that New Zealand must comply with 
the 
relevant treaty obligations for at least the next eleven years. Thus, any 
new 
labour legislation that is enacted over this period will have to conform to
 the 
standards set by the conventions. 
52 
ERA's Deficiency For Full Compliance 
The ER Act substantially complies with Conventions 87 and 98, but there
 are 
several areas that are problematic and may need to be amended be
fore 
ratification can take place: 
1. The main stumbling block seems to be that the ER Act does not recognis
e the 
lawfulness of sympathy strikes and strikes over social and economic issues. 
53 
5 1 Ratification ofTLO Convention ELB, Jan 2002, By Dr P. Roth, P.4 
52 Id. P.5 
53 ELB, Jan. 2002, By Paul Roth, P 5 
27 
As sympathy strikes are becoming increasingly :frequent because of the move 
towards concentration of enterprises, globaljsation of the economy and the 
decentralisation of work centres,
54 the ILO Commjttee of Experts on 
Freedom of Experts expressed the view that a general prohibition of 
sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and workers should be allowed to take 
such an action provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful. 
55 
If the ERA were changed to render these forms of industrial action Lawful, 
however, it would run counter to the symmetry that currently exjsts between 
strikes and lockouts in New Zealand law. A centre Left government should 
not have any philosophical problem in conferring such rights on unions, but a 
government eager to please business might feel compelled to give employers 
corresponding rights to Lock out workers in support of other employers.
56 The 
difficulty of ratification of this basic core standard and its relevance to NZ 
One such example of some relevance to New Zealand might be the 
requirement (derived from JLO jurisprudence rather than the convention) that 
freedom of association under Convention 87 includes the right to participate 
in political and secondary strikes. This requirement has posed problems for 
the United Kingdom (which has been criticised for breaching the Convention 
in this respect) and may pose problems if the New Zealand Government 
seeks to ratify the convention. The requirement that secondary and sympathy 
strikes be permitted, while desirable, would hardly seem to be essential and 
may well reflect European views of democratic legitimacy particularly in 
relation to political strikes. A possibly more constructive approach would be 
to consider whether a country permitted an effective right to strike - a right 
that clearly does exjst in New Zealand. It is arguable, for example, that the 
current prohibition on replacement labour during a strike can be seen as a 
quid pro quo for the ban on secondary action. Other standards, especially 
those directed at specific areas of employment, are often very detailed and 
54 Freedom of Association & Collective Bargaining, Report 111 (Part 48) 81 " Session I L
C, 1994, 
ILO Para 168 
55 Freedom of Association , Digest of Decis ions & Principle of Committee, 4
1
h dition , ILO Para 
486 & 487 
56 ELB, Jan . 2002, By Paul Roth , P 5 
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perhaps stress prescription and detail at the expense of underlying 
objectives 
and flexibility of application. 
57 
The ERA is also deficient in its protection of workers against discri
mination 
for having gone on strike. Under the ILO freedom of association p
rinciples, 
workers should be protected against discrimination on the grounds o
f having 
participated in lawful industrial action. Such protection need
s to be 
extended to situations where strikers are not actually penalised, 
but non-
strikers are effectively rewarded (eg. by being given wage incr
ements). 
There had been such protection under the EC Act, but section 10
7 of the 
ERA purports to set out a complete code of activities intended to be
 covered 
by the union involvement discrimination grievance, and it o
mits the 
situation where the employee "had been on strike, or had a notice 
of strike 
given on his or her behalf under this Act"
58 
Application of Conventions in Cases 
To date there has been a number of cases wherein the applica
tions of 
I 
Conventions 87 & 98 have been adopted towards interpretation of 
the ERA 
thus far. 
i.In the case of NZ Employers Federation Incorporated v Nation
al 
Union of Public Employees (NUPE)
59 and Others, the issue was 
whether the registration applications of 40 unions had been dul
y 
processed by the Registrar of Unions, who purportedly relied on th
e 
Interpretation Act 1999, which allows the exercise of a power i
n 
anticipation of the coming into force of an enactment where ''th
e 
exercise of power is necessary or desirable to bring or in connectio
n 
with bringing, an enactment into operation."
60 The support of the 
validity of the union registrations adopted in this case was that th
e 
principles underlying Article 2, Convention 87 requires th
e 
57 The Role of International Labour Standards, By Gordon Anderson, E
LB, March 2002, P 21 
58 ELB, Jan 2002, By P Roth, 5 
59 CA 32/01, 24 September 2001 
60 ELB, Jan 2002, By P Roth P 6 
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formalities prescribed by law for the establishment of a trade union 
that union should not be applied in such a manner as to delay or 
prevent the establishment of trade union organizations.
61 
This 
contention was rejected in that "It does not follow that mass 
registration of unions before ERA came into force was necessary or 
that, even with appropriate forward planning there would inevitably 
have been a logjam preventing employee associations and their 
members from exercising their rights and responsibilities under the 
ERA." Such affirms that the registration provisions remain aligned 
with the Convention as the Unions are justified in exercising their 
rights to be considered as coming within the scope of legitimate 
trade union activities.
62 
As a matter of interest, the nature and role played by the large number of unions 
that have registered since the introduction of the ER Act, some 150 in the first 
year was looked at through fuidings based partly on a telephone questionnaire 
survey of representatives of some enterprise based unions. Among the fuidings 
the following was noted: 
• Most of the new unions are enterprise-based and genuinely represent 
their members although in a narrow range of endeavours. Both officials 
and members appeared to regard such unions as a collective bargaining 
vehicle ( often being formed from a informal bargaining committee 
operating under the EC Act) with few wider objectives. Many did not 
see themselves as a union in any wider sense; 
• A small number appear to have a very close relationship with 
management and appear to exist relationship with management and 
appear to exist to frustrate established unions gaining access to 
workplaces; 
61 Digest, Para 251 
62 Digest, Para 3 7 
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• A small number of new unions operating alongside established unions 
indicated a strong desire to freeload on the main collective agreement 
usually by "negotiating" a mirror agreement. 
This trend of new unions mushrooming after the ERA thus seem to develop 
the concept of ''United we stand, Multiplied we fall".
63
Hence, the 
fundamental principles of freedom of association which affirms the 
establishment and joining of unions by workers on their own choosing 
without distinction whatsoever may seem ideal but from a practical point of 
view, such could become the causative factor for more complications and/or 
disputes. 
ii. a) In the case of NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & 
Manufacturing Union Inc v Independent Newspapers Ltd,
64 
the 
applicant union, which had initiated bargaining for a meca, 
contended that INL, the parent company, and its tern newspapers, 
breached their duty of good faith by insisting on bargaining only for 
site agreements. The Authority invoked principles the level of 
bargaining underlying Convention 98,65 which supported the 
employer's position that the union could not determine coverage of a 
collective agreement ought to be a matter that is left to be 
determined by the parties to the collective bargaining themselves 
through negotiation. In the result, the Authority issued compliance 
orders that one newspaper should cease and desist from refusing to 
consider negotiating a meca; and that all of the respondents meet 
with union for the purposes of bargaining for a meca. In so doing, 
the respondents were required to consider and respond to all of the 
union's claims. 
b) Likewise, in National Distribution Union v Sawmill Services 
Limited, the union initiated bargaining for a meca, but the three 
companies concerned did not wish to become parties to such an 
63 Recent Research, By Gordon Anderson, ELB, May 2002, P 62 
64 WA 51/01, 3 August 2001, G J Wood 
65 Digest, Paras 851-855 
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arrangement. The Authority noted that the issues raised in this case 
were nearly identical with those in the INL case. In both cases, 
impasse had been reached because the employers were of the view 
that they were not obliged to enter a meca if they did not wish to, 
and the union was of the view that the employers were obliged to 
negotiate for a meca because of the employee ballot held under s 45 
of the Act, and because the union had initiated the bargaining for a 
meca. The Authority's position was that there was nothing in the 
statutory scheme that required employers in these circumstances to 
negotiate on the basis that any concluded agreement necessarily had 
to be a meca. The Authority found that both sides had closed their 
minds in relation to whether there would or would not be a meca: 
"Both positions were based on the parties' understanding of the 
meaning of the Act, but on an appropriate application of the good 
faith provisions all parties must be prepared to discuss and 
reconsider their stance."
66 
111. Section 14(1)(d) of the ERA provides that an incorporated 
society is entitled to union registration if it "is independent of 
and is constituted and operates at arm's length from, any 
employer." This provision is consistent with Article 2(2) of 
Convention 98, which deems as an act of interference with 
workers' organization any act "which is designed to promote the 
establishment of workers' organizations under the domination of 
employers or employers' organizations or to support workers' 
organizations by financial or other means, with the object of 
placing such organizations under the control of employers or 
1 , · · ,,67 emp oyers orgaruzat1ons. 
The legal test application of such can be seen in the case of Meat & 
Related Trades Workers Union of Aotearoa (MWUA) v Te Kuiti 
Beef Workers Union Inc (TKU).68 This case involved a substantial 
66 AA 134/01, Sep 2001, RA Monaghan 
67 ELB (Jan 2002) BY P. Roth 
68 AA 37/01 April 2001, AA 37A 
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number of employees of UBP who had no wish to join MWUA but 
formed another union TRU through the assistance of UBP's 
Managing Director. UBP negotiated the collective agreement with 
TKU before negotiating with MWUA and the agreements were 
eventually concluded with both the unions. When the relationship 
between the two Unions became strained MWUA challenged TKU's 
independence under Section 14 (1) (D) heard by the employment 
court. The court however found a statutory presumption of Section 
14 (1) compliance arose at the time of Union registration. Therefore, 
once a Union was registered under Section 14 the court will only 
hear challenges based on issues arising after registration. As such 
MWUA must establish that since registration, TKU has ceased to 
comply with the requirements of Section 14 (1). The court found the 
facts clearly point to a finding that in practice the actual formation 
and operation of the TKU were clearly not in breach of Section 14 
(l)(D). The crucial factors that lead to this direction was: 
• That the initiative to form a Union (and to reject the MWUA) came 
from the employees concerned and that while the MD of UBP both 
picked up on this feeling and realised these benefits for them to have an 
in-house Union. He was careful to ensure that the steps he took to 
facilitate this was soon to be relatively neutral ( other than perhaps the 
payment of the legal fees). 
• The advice given to the potential members, including presentations was 
balanced and presented with various options. There appear to be no 
pressure by the MD to force a particular outcome. 
• The MD ensured ( or possibly events ensured) that the initiative to 
actually set up the TKU and control of its direction shifted to the 
members as soon as possible. 
33 
• The events after registration gave no particular indication of a lack of
 
independence and it may also be relevant that the MWU A was in effect 
represented at TKU and negotiated a collective agreement with it. 
69 
The test set out by the court provide some guidance as to what may 
constitute not operating at arms length although some of it may be easy to 
apply in practice. The court also mentioned that if Union members include 
an employer or employer's representative that may comprorruse 
independence. 
70 
1v. Sections 23 and 24 of the ERA potentially impede the right 
workers "without distinction whatsoever ... to join organizations 
of their own choosing without previous authorisations" in terms 
of article 2 of Convention 87. Sections 23 and 24 restrict access 
by union organisers to certain workplaces. These are workplaces 
where: the employees are not union members; there are no more 
than 20 employees; and the employer is an individual and holds 
a current certificate of exemption from the Department of 
Labour on the grounds that ''the employer is a practising member 
of a religious society or order whose doctrines or beliefs 
preclude membership of any organization or body other than the 
religious society or order of which the employer is a member". 
These provisions were added to the ER Bill at the request of the 
Exclusive Brethren.
71 The access provisions in the ERA are 
significantly wider than those in the ECA where the access 
provisions are to be interpreted in a manner that reflects the 
statutory objectives and are not to be narrowly construed or 
applied in accordance with subjective views of either party. 
It may nevertheless be interesting to note the case of National 
Distribution Union v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd
72 as it concerns the 
use of access rights during a strike at a time the work of strikers 
69 Recent Case Comment, By Gordon Anderson, ELB, March 2002, P 34 
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72 National Distribution Union Inc v Carter Holt Harvey Ltd, (AC 79/01 ), 3 D
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was being done by non-striking workers. 60% of staff were 
members of the union. Following breakdown of negotiations for 
a collective agreement the union called a total strike 
accompanied by a picket which at various times, however, the 
picket became somewhat disorderly. Union officials sought 
access to the plant under Section 20 to ensure compliance with 
section 97 and to seek to recruit employees that might be 
operating the machinery. They were first denied entry to the 
premises but later permitted only to the boardroom where they 
could meet with all employees. This offer was declined and 
access to the actual plant sought. This was refused on safety 
grounds. Eventually, when the officials moved towards the plant, 
they were arrested by Police and charged with trespass. The bail 
terms precluded the officials supporting the picketers further. 
The Employment Court held that: 
• The union officials posed no safety threat and were 
conversant with safety requirements and the real reason 
was the worry about potential intimidation if the non-
striking employees doing work of strikers were 
identified. 
• The officials intent was on exercising their lawful rights 
of entry and that they "did not seek industrial martyrdom 
by ritualistic conduct by which they were arrested." (It 
might be noted, rightly of course that the Court did not 
comment on the appropriateness of use of bail terms to 
deny union officials the right to carry out their jobs.) 
• " ... the Act supports and sets out to promote collective 
bargaining and recognises and addresses 'the inherent 
inequality of bargaining power m employment 
relationships': s3(a)(ii). Section 97 1s one of the 
provisions that does so. Its purpose is to ensure that 
35 
employers cannot use strikebreakers to blunt the 
economic effect of a strike (or equally, a lockout) by 
limiting the circumstances in which an employer may 
employ other persons to perform the work of striking or 
locked out employees. It is putting a strained construction 
on ordinary language to suggest that s97 does not deal 
with employment related rights in relation to union 
members." 
• "Good faith has more to do notions of honesty, frankness 
and what lawyers call 'bona :tides' rather than adherence 
to legal rules." In this case the arrest of the union officials 
as trespassers, the refusal of access and the refusal to 
disclose the true reasons for denying access were held to 
be breaches of the good faith obligation. 
This case confirms the access provisions in the ERA are significantly wider 
than those in the in the E C Act. Access is no longer purely for the purpose of 
discussions with members on restricted matters but is much broader and 
includes a number of monitoring functions as well as access for safety & health 
matters.73 
Also of interest in this case are the Court's comments on good faith. On the 
basis of these, unions may find that good faith is very much a two edged sword 
in industrial disputes and may also find that an unsympathetic court might 
interpret the obligation in quite broad terms.
74 
The Elimination of Child Labour 
The conventions applicable under this heading are: 
• Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) 
• Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) 
73 ELB (March 2002 Recent Cases Comment: By G. Anderson, P 37 
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Prior to June 2001, it may on a narrow observation seem
 totally absurd for N.Z. 
to have refrained from the ratification of these convention
s in particular No. 182 
as such an action could cast a deeming policy provision o
f N.Z. condoning such 
an inhumane phenomenon. However, on probing into an a
nalysis of the questions 
for non-ratification of conventions mentioned above 
relative to the scope, 
definitions, principles of national policies and action to
 be undertaken under 
these conventions reveals that the "sore thumb" of frustrat
ion with both Australia 
and New Zealand was the minimum age factor. 
When the motion for convention No. 138 was tabled, 
Australia raised strong 
objections to the following Article: 
"Each member undertakes a national policy designe
d to ensure effective 
abolition of child labour and to raise progressively 
the minimum age for 
admission to employment on work to a level consistent 
with its fullest physical 
and mental development of young persons." 
75The higher age limit being 18. 
They considered that such is not only vague and absur
d but also difficult to 
apply. They therefore proposed to fix ''the minimum 
age for admission to 
employment to be in accordance with the requirements of this
 Convention"
76 as 
their rationale of compulsory education policy renders 
completion of school 
education at the age of 15; after which they may be allo
wed work under non-
hazardous employment; which was also the case for N
Z. This was however 
dismissed on majority vote. 
As for the Convention No. 182 - Worst Forms of Child 
Labour 1999, the NZ 
Government during replies and commentary stages of the 
Convention advocated 
strongly for the reconstruction of "all forms of child labour" 
as not all forms of 
labour are considered to be harmful. Hence proposed for
 the words ''the worst 
forms of' to be inserted before child labour; which was suppo
rted by the NZEF 
but NZCTU supported the wording "all forms of labour"
77 to remain. In spite of 
their strong support and favour of this new Convention 
they did not ratify the 
same early. This possibly was due to NZCTU's stand as w
ell as ILO' s contention 
of this Convention being adopted to complement Conven
tion No.138 and such 
75 TLO Labour Conference, 58
1
h Session Geneva 1973 
76 Id 
77 ILO Labour Conference, 87
1
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may produce pressure to ratify Convention 138. In June 2001, NZ ratified 
Convention No 182 thus accepting the age limitation of 18 as being appropriate 
for worst forms of child labour, and such will have no coaxing for ratifying No. 
13 8, as NZ like that of Australia are in full adherence to the requirements of 
Convention 138 except for that of the age factor. 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Having pursued with the fundamental ILO conventions, it would be essential to 
also cover the Convention No. 155 concerning occupational safety, health and 
working environment; which is in fact an integral part of employment law. N.Z. 
has not ratified this Convention but has enforced national laws governing most of 
the ILO proposals under Recommendation No. 164. Refocusing on the question 
for non ratification, the analysis of all essential requisite Articles of the 
Convention necessitates the public authorities, employers, workers and others to 
be accountable towards the complimentary character of responsibilities required 
and that of the national conditions and practice. For instance, the Convention 
stipulates: 78 
a) "The branches of economic activity and as well as its workers also 
includes the public sector". Hence the government is not only the 
monitoring authority for the private sectors and workers but also on itself. 
It has to be therefore the perfect model in order to ensure the expectation 
of such from others. 
b) "Employer's work place also covers all places where workers need to be 
even if such is not under their direct control". Such would render 
difficulty of prosecution, as negligence would have to be directly 
attributable. 
c) "Health covers also the physical and mental elements affecting health at 
work". These are also difficult aspects to be affirmatively established and 
proven; thus protracting the litigation process. 
d) "Occupational safety, health and the working environment to be reviewed 
at appropriate intervals and enforcement of the laws and regulations shall 
78 ILO Labour Conventions & Recommendations , lLO, Geneva 
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be secured by an adequate and appropriate system of inspection". The 
public authorities are at this stage not being able to achieve this 
efficiently. 
The policies and actions stipulated in the convention therefore calls for a 
tripartite perfection/commitment; failing which there will only be assigning of 
blame against each other leading to bad world publicity from the international 
pressure through the ILO and also the increasing level of litigation process 
leading to possible labour unrest and declining economic stability. Hence, the 
practical solution is to adopt the ILO Recommendation No. 164 in stages through 
national laws and create the awareness through the society in a gradual manner; 
which in fact is in line with the Government's viewpoint as expressed by Mr. 
Thom in 1948, leading to the formulation of the Government's standing policy 
on ratification. 
The objective and obligations of the current Health & Safety in Employment 
(HSE) Act 1992 incorporates major aspects of the Convention relative to Scope 
& Definitions, Principles of National Policy and its Actions as well as that of the 
Employers. More fine tuning has been also done by the way of the HSE 
Amendment Bill excepted to come into force soon; which would then bring the 
Act more closer to the Convention. Some of such changes
79 
proposed are: 
1) Definition of "harm" will now explicitly include mental harm & "hazard" 
and will also be extended to arising through mental or physical fatigue. 
Under Article 3 of the Convention for "health", it includes the physical & 
mental elements affecting health, which are directly related to Safety & 
Hygiene at work. 
2) "Place of Work" will include vehicles so as to be applicable to mobile 
workers; which under the Convention, "workplace" covers all places 
where workers need to be or to go by reason of their work. 
79 www.osh.dol.govt.nz 
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3) Broader spectrum of employees coverage is now made to include also rail 
workers, crew aboard ships, aircraft & volunteers; making it another step 
forward to Convention compliance which calls for all "branches of 
economic activity". 
4) Article 19(b) of the Convention stipulates that there should be 
arrangements under which representatives of workers in the undertaking 
co-operate with the employer in the field of occupational safety & health. 
Accordingly, the amendments places a new duty on all employers to have 
a "system" which may involve electing Health & Safety representatives 
or it may involve establishing a Health & Safety Committee (as provided 
for under the ILO Recommendation 164). 
5) Article 9 of the Convention stipulates enforcement of laws & regulations 
concerning OSH and the working environment shall be secured by an 
adequate and appropriate system of inspection for effective enforcement. 
The Bill increases the imprisonment term and fine under Section 49 
( cause of serious harm) of the Act from one year to 2 years and the fine of 
not more than $100,000 to now $500,000. Under Section 50 (Other 
offences) the 2 fine levels of not exceeding $50,000 for failure of safety 
precautions causing serious harm on any person and $20,000 in any other 
case is now combined as one with a fine of not more than $100,000. 
6) The Amendment will also make it clear that an Inspector's functions also 
include ascertaining the Act has been complied with or is likely to be 
complied with. It will be amended to allow the Inspectors to exercise 
their powers of entry and inspection in a variety of places rather than 
being confined to the place of work currently. 
The Bill which was before the Select Committee had considered all the 
public submissions made on the Bill and must now report back to Parliament 
by 29th November 2002 but can report back earlier.
80 
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The Singapore Tripartism Approach 
Introduction 
Singapore, which is as big as Lake Tau po of NZ but with a population
 quite close 
to that of NZ has achieved the status of being the newly industrialise
d economies 
of the world. It is a city State without the benefit of resources for dev
elopment. 
Hence, it has to function to a significant extent as what a factory does
, i.e. it does 
not own anything as all inputs for production have to be brought and
 all outputs 
sold must involve international market. The significant solution for it
 to maintain 
as well as increase competitiveness of its products is to keep w
ages, which 
constitute a dominant part of production costs, in line with producti
vity growth. 
This would require an efficient employment law administration 
that works 
effectively on a unique tripartite relationship like that of the ILO
 but with a 
genuine spirit of cooperation and collaboration. The labour market 
mechanisms 
operating in Singapore are therefore reinforced by its macro-econom
ic policies, 
which are to maintain a strong currency value and to enable wages
 to increase 
through productivity growth so as to ensure continued economic adva
ncement. 
81 
The Industrial Relations Practice 
Singapore has a strong trade union movement. They were initiall
y politically 
oriented, especially under the British colonial government of 
the 1950s. 
However, with independence, their function has changed from an o
rganization 
whose main objective were to impose restrictive conditions in the 
conduct of 
trade or business and to promote, organise or finance strikes, to one t
hat seeks to 
promote good industrial relations and to raise productivity for the
 benefit of 
employees, employers and the economy of the Nation.
82 
The Registrar of Trade Unions has the power to refuse registration
 to a trade 
union if he is satisfied that there is another trade union which
 may fairly 
represent the particular trade, occupation or industry or if the propose
d union is 
not in the best interest of the workers affected. Singapore has essenti
ally 3 types 
of unions: house, general and industry. A house union's membership 
is limited to 
81 Employment Relations in Growing Asian Economies (ERGAE) P. 6
3 
82 Industrial Relations in Singapore - Prof. Basu Sharma, University o
f New Brunsuick, Canada 
(hereafter referred as Prof. Basu Sharma) 
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a particular company, that of a general union comes from a variety of indust
ries, 
while membership of an industry union clearly consists of workers in the s
ame 
industry. The latter 2 types of unions will accordingly have a numbe
r of 
branches, which in turn, may be affiliated to labour centres such as the Nati
onal 
Trades Union Congress (NTUC), which represents about 95% of union mem
bers 
with 70 out of 83 registered unions in the country. 
83 Such limitation imposed to 
registration of unions does not reflect the liberal principles enunciated under
 the 
ILO Convention no. 87; hence they have not ratified the same to date. 
Standard economic theory states that wages are determined according to the
 law 
of demand and supply. Hence, in the labour market, the norm is that the t
rade 
union gets to set wages , while the employer has the final say on the level o
f 
employment. The types of policy adopted by the trade union will give rise to 
two 
industrial relations (IR) regimes, the wage-driven and the employment dr
iven 
regime. If the aim of the trade union is to maximise wages, the IR regime res
ults 
in wage-driven. 
84 On the other hand, if the trade union seeks to maximise 
employment for its members, the IR regime would result in employment-dri
ven. 
The NTUC aims to have wages set at a level which maximises employment. 
This 
means that NTUC sets wages at the equilibrium level under perfect competit
ion, 
as a result of which employment is maximised, thereby shifting the demand
 for 
labour by looking for ways to make the economy more competitive. 
85 The most 
puzzling question is: How is the Union & Employers are able to accept in "g
ood 
faith" the incomes policy of the Government? The Government had to there
fore 
seek ways of unifying the interests of all 3 parties through the use of consen
sual 
approach, giving everyone a better understanding and cooperation to realise
 the 
appropriate policy towards employment growth and a good investment clim
ate 
for business enhancement, thus generating increased revenue for the governm
ent, 
sustainable mcome as well as future savings through compuls
ory 
employee/employer provident fund contributions for the workers 
and 
profitability for all businesses. Such mutual/collective discourses between par
ties 
developed better understanding of each other's differences by focussing towa
rds 
83 ERGAE P. 64 
84 Employment - Driven Industrial Relations Regime (EDIRR) - Chew/Chew 
P. 7 
85 Id P. 8 
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the reality of situations prevailing and striking the best wm-wm solution. 
Additionally, achievement was more enhanced by promoting tripartism very 
actively through policy-making institutions such as the National Wages Council 
(NWC), the Skills Development Fund, the Central Provident Fund ( compulsory 
savings mechanism through statutory contributions by both employees & 
employers). 86 
Accordingly, in order to provide industrial peace which is vital to attract foreign 
investment, a series of labour legislations are introduced to minimise disputes 
between management and unions, thereby shifting the concept of the trade union 
from that of a wage-driven regime to that of an employment-driven regime, 
where-in wages are not raised to the extent that it causes a reduction in 
employment and/or inflation. 
87 Hence, unlike NZ however, Singapore has 
ratified Convention No. 98 and the rationale could be that the promotion of 
collective bargaining ''through the autonomy of the parties and voluntary nature 
of negotiations" is of significant importance for ensuring that a high level of 
productivity is maintained and to be constantly vigilant of the various forces 
which can weaken the economy and adopting the appropriate macro-economic 
policies88 so as to contain such at its inception. Another favourable reasoning for 
ratification may also be that Convention 98 provides the flexibility of 
"machinery appropriate to national conditions" for right to organise as well as the 
"measures appropriate to national conditions"
89 for voluntary negotiations 
between employers and workers. 
Singapore recognises the right to strike except for workers in the water, gas and 
electricity sectors, which are considered vital services. Workers in other essential 
services may exercise the right to strike, but they must give sufficient notice to 
the employer affected. Trade disputes, the majority of which involved wage 
issues are more under the non-unionised sector than those of unionised. The 
86 Id P. 92 
87 ERGAE P. 64 
88 Id 
89 Article 3 & 4, ILO Conventions No. 98 
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Minister of Labour quite often gets involved in preventive mediation to head off 
potential disputes. 90 
The NWC is one of Singapore's most important tripartite institutions. It is 
comprised of a Chairman and 9 members, 3 representatives of each of the 
government, employers and workers in order to fulfil its mandate.
91 One of the 
major roles played by the government is in the regulation of incomes as part of 
the responsibility for the macro-management of the economy, by implementation 
of the incomes policies through the NWC that is very different from that which is 
practiced by other developed countries.
92 The NWC has made several sets of 
wage recommendations over the years. Although it has no statutory power, the 
parties and also the Industrial Arbitration Court (IAC) have closely followed its 
recommendations. 93 The IAC for instance, when arbitrating a collective 
agreement or wage dispute would require explicit guidelines of the economy to 
make its findings and there is none better than the consensual guidelines from the 
tripartite body (NWC).9
4 The rigidities inherent in the traditional wage system 
and the pressure of competitiveness in the 1980s forced the government to re-
examine the wage system, thus introducing a flexible wage system in 1986, 
which comprised of the following components:
95 
1. A measure of stability in workers' income. 
2. An annual wage supplement of one month's pay, which could be adjusted 
under exceptional circumstances. 
3. A variable bonus based on individual and company performance to be 
paid annually or half-annually. 
4. A small service increment of which could be given for loyalty, experience 
and/or length of service. 
The rationale for adopting such incomes policy is primarily Singapore being a 
non-resourceful state and any unfortunate experience of inflation would be 
disastrous to its economy making it less competitive in the international market. 
90 Prof. Basu Sharma 
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92 EDIRR P. I 37 
93 Prof. Basu Sharma 
94 EDIRRP. 121 
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Thus, in order to eliminate inflation, there must exist a central authority of 
tripartite structure, which would ensure that all firms reduce their wage increases. 
Workers would be no worse off as the real wages would be maintained, there 
would not be any unemployment resulting from less competitive export prices 
and such policy would also cease the demonstration effect which activates the 
wage transfer mechanism (spill over effect of wage increase in one sector to 
another).96 Hence, under such an employment-driven regime, apart from 
maintaining real wages and maximising employment, it also enhances the 
following: 97 
• Collective Bargaining. Where uruon negotiates for a fair share of the 
labour rewards and not for benefits to the extent that employment is 
adversely affected. 
• Work Discipline. It would be in the interest of the union, that it ensures 
their workforces are efficient; thus developing quality based workers 
whose wage system has shifted from quantitative to qualitative system. 
• Disputes become generally less common and relatively easier to resolve. 
All in all, it increases the business competitiveness, rendering the Singapore 
National Employers Federation's acceptance of the labour movement in 
Singapore. 98 
Occupational Safety & Health. 
Key feature being targeted 1s to prioritise the inspection schedules. 
Computerised data on accident statistics and safety performances enables the 
Occupational Safety & Health Dept.(OSHD) focus on problematic sites and 
concentrate on preventive measures in specific targeted areas. Factories 
employing more than 50 or more workers are required to form a safety 
committee comprising representatives from both management and workers. Their 
functions are: 
96 EDrRR P. 138 
97 IdP.8-12 
98 Id P 103 
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• To promote co-operation in achieving and maintaining safe and healthy 
work environment between management and workers. 
• To carry out regular inspections in the factory and to inspect the scene of 
any accident or dangerous occurrence. 
There is also the requirement to employ either full-time or part-time safety 
officers on the basis of the class categorisation of factories so as to enforce the 
Department's vision of guiding them towards self-regulation of promoting safety 
& health at work. 
A full-time or part-time safety officer shall spend respectively at least 40 hours 
or 15 hours per week exclusively on safety supervision and promoting the safe 
conduct ofwork.
99 
The Department therefore closely monitors the activities of safety committees 
and safety personnel at work sites. District Officers would also sit in on safety 
committee meetings on a selective basis to assist them not only to resolving 
safety issues but also in reviewing their safety management and audit the safety 
system already in place and also guiding them towards self-regulation of 
promoting safety at work. Training of all new workers before commencement of 
work and continuous on going training is provided at the OSH Training Centre 
from time to time; as such is expected to develop a serious sense of commitment 
and awareness towards ensuring safety & health practices at work. 
Apart from stringent penalties up to a maximum of $200,000 fine and one year 
imprisonment, the tripartite concept of Advisory committees comprising top 
level representatives from the government, management and workers' unions 
have also been formed to help improve the standard of safety in the respective 
industries and to recommend measures for the prevention of accidents. 
The major safety & health event, the Annual Safety Performance Awards is 
another initiative spearheaded by the Government. This is held annually in a 
leading Hotel to give recognition and honour to those factories/ Plants with good 
99 Factories Act (www.gov.sg/mom/lrd/lrd.html) 
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safety records through the implementation of sound safety management systems. 
Advisory committees comprising top-level representatives from government, 
management and workers unions have been formed to help improve the standard 
of safety in respective industries and recommend measures for the prevention of 
accidents. 100 
CONCLUSION 
The main point to be taken from the above discussion is that ratification of 
Conventions 87 and 98 is likely in the near future, and that these instruments 
will be binding on New Zealand for at least the subsequent 11 years. Therefore, 
in practical terms, ratification will irreversibly set the future tone for collective 
labour law in this country. The principle obstacle to ratification is the current 
law's failure to recognise the legality of sympathy strikes and strikes over social 
and economic issues. Overcoming this obstacle will be likely to involve some 
adjustment in the symmetry that presently exists in the law's treatment of 
strikes and lockouts. 
The limited role played thus far by Convention 87 and 98 in the interpretation 
of the ERA has not been one-sided, to the advantage only of unions. Moreover, 
the case law to date has illustrated that the Conventions and the principles that 
underpin them are not highly prescriptive, but allow degree of flexibility in their 
Ii · 101 app cat10n. 
The perceived tension, between economic growth and labour standards has 
become most obvious in the World Trade Organization (WTO). If labour 
standards were incorporated into trade agreements they become considerably 
more significant as, unlike most international organizations, the WTO has 
strong and effective enforcement mechanisms. The politics of the WTO on 
labour standards are far from clear but in general support for the inclusion of 
such standards derives its support from some, although far from all, developed 
countries and especially union lobbies within those countries. Developing 
countries on the other hand are strongly opposed to any trade-labour linkage 
arguing that the incorporation of labour standards into trade agreements is a 
100 www.gov.sg/mom/lrd/lrd.html 
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protectionist device designed to preclude developing countries from taking 
advantage of one of their sources of comparative advantage in international 
trade, namely their low labour costs. This suspicion is clearly justifiable given 
the tendency of developed economies to develop protectionist devices to 
discriminate against developing countries that achieve any degree of 
industrialisation. 10
2 
The Singapore Labour Minister, during his speech at the g3rd session of the ILO 
Conference, Geneva on 11 th June 1996 emphasised that notwithstanding the 
significant progress in liberalising trade, we are yet to have achieved true global 
free trade as the barriers to free and unrestricted trade still exist; as such if 
linkage between labour and trade were to be established, it could negate efforts 
to promote free trade and retard economic growth of all nations and worst 
affected will be the developing countries. Instead of encouraging investment 
and economic development, such linkage is likely to slow down growth and job 
creation in the developing countries. Emphasis was also made of the OECD 
report that there is no "solid empirical evidence to suggest that lower labour 
standards in the developing countries have enabled them to enjoy gains in 
market share to the detriment of high standards countries".
103 
To its credit the New Zealand Government has recognised the relevance of 
international labour standards in the context of its international trade obligations 
and issued a statement on its approach to this issue which states that "in both 
multilateral and bilateral contexts, the Government will take a consistent 
approach that will reflect its objective of promoting decent work in the global 
economy." The Government statement indicates that it views the ILO's 
Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work as providing an appropriate basis 
for the discussion of labour standards within the :framework of trade 
agreements. Hopefully New Zealand employers and unions could all agree on at 
least that the basic principles in the ILO Declaration and work towards their 
hi 
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In this respect, it would be worthwhile focussing on the outlook of
 Professor 
Jean Claude Javillier, Director of the International Standards Departm
ent of the 
ILO and one of the key officials charged with advancing internatio
nal labour 
standards. Addressing an audience of academics, lawyers and 
industrial 
relations practitioners, Professor Javillier spoke of the need to ensur
e that the 
standards emerging from the ILO were flexible, responsive to loca
l cultural 
circumstances and able to be applied in the field. He stressed, howeve
r, that one 
must never forget the basic principles that lie behind those standa
rds. Over 
recent years the ILO has been criticised, with some justification
, for the 
overproduction of standards and for producing standards that are s
o detailed 
that ratification becomes extremely difficult even when a country co
nforms to 
the core principles underlying the standard, even with the basic core 
standards. 
He drew attention to a number of developments that may help im
prove the 
application and effectiveness of international standards. While these
 included 
changes in approach within the ILO, especially towards greater fle
xibility of 
application and the need to ensure the practicality of standards. He 
also cited 
one interesting development of bipartite standard setting in some
 areas of 
international maritime employment is taking place outside the fo
rmal ILO 
tripartite structure; which would represent a major advance as par
ts of that 
industry are notorious for their appalling standards of employment. 
105 
Singapore could also be seen as one of the model ILO members havin
g adopted 
flexibility of application but with the ILO spirit of tripartism exerci
sed at its 
level. It is today well known for its stable and harmonious industrial relat
ions. It 
has proven that stability and harmony are the result of sound and co
operative 
tripartite relations between labour, management and the governmen
t. 106 The 
economic indicator of Singapore authenticates that since 1978, the n
umber of 
industrial stoppages and number of man days lost are virtually ni
l. 107 The 
symbiotic relationship between the Union and the Government has evo
lved over 
the years but more than a decade of "dynamic cooperation" between
 them and 
with the corporate managements led to the restructuring of the 
industrial 
105 ELB, March 2002, By Gordon Anderson 
106 Prof. Basu Sharma 
107 EDIRR, P 45 
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re a ions sys em seen to e stringent (some may even co
nstrue 1t as 
draconian!) and unacceptable against the principles of the ILO
 fundamental 
rights of human beings, but it has proven such being a necessity 
to meet with 
the realities of the economic challenges for progress and develo
pment of its 
people through proper utilisation of its only wealth of resourc
e available -
''their human resource". 
Legal freedom has no true value as it is contingent upon a individ
ual's degree of 
social freedom. Many international human rights document
s and labour 
conventions seek to balance the competing interests between labo
ur and capital 
upon which employment relationships are inherently based; which
 was summed 
well by Kahn-Freund: 
"To restrain a person's freedom of contract may be necessary 
to protect his 
freedom, that is to protect him against oppression which he may otherw
ise be 
constrained to impose upon himself through an act of his legally fr
ee and socially 
unfree will. To mistake the conceptual apparatus of the law for
 the image of 
society may produce a distorted view of the employment relation".
109 
Although ideally it may be construed that NZ may be near to rati
fication of the 
fundamental core ILO conventions 87 & 98, in reality it may yet b
e too far! That 
which can be adduced from the Singapore experience is that freed
om is vital and 
if it is well guided and utilised it forms an integral part for prog
ressiveness of 
society. However, "absolute freedom" without limitations 
may become 
destructive when abused. The collectivism of decision making
 of its socio-
economic policies through the tripartism concept can be seen 
as the proven 
success formula for Singapore. 
108 Prof. Basu Sharma 
109 Kahn-Freund, Labour and The Law, (1972), P I 6. 
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